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Abstract
This paper develops a model of noncooperative network formation. Link formation is
two-sided. Information flow is two-way. The paper is built upon Bala and Goyal (2000). A
unique assumption is that the value of information decays as it flows through each agent,
and the decay is increasing and concave in the number of his links. Thus, an agent may
choose to avoid accessing an agent who possess many links since he is aware of the decay
incurred through this agent. This avoidance leads to two particular results in the analysis
of Nash networks: (1) Nash networks are not always connected; (2) Nash networks do not
exist under some parameters. Since disconnectedness is reminiscent of a common feature
of real-world network, the model may explain why real-world networks may exhibit this
feature even when there is no heterogeneity among agents. Discussion on this insight is
provided.
*ALHOSN University, Uniterd Arab Emirates. E-mail: b.charoensook@alhosnu.ae. This paper is a chapter of
my doctoral dissertation, which was supervised by Dino Gerardi. I thank him for his guidance and generous
supports
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1 Introduction
This paper presents amodel of network formation game that is built upon the two-way flow
model of Bala and Goyal (2000), henceforth BG. A unique assumption is that an increase in link
establishment damages the quality of information that flows in the network. Under this assumption,
each agent knows that his decision to add a link causes a decline in the value of information
flow. This decline is a disbenefit both to himself and other agents in the network. Hence, on top
of link formation cost, there are additional disbenefits associated with link formation. This pa-
per aims to understand how this assumption may affect link-formation decision of agents and
hence the shape of networks. To this end, we characterize the shapes of equilibrium networks
and analyze why they differ from those in the literature. Finally, using the analyses the paper
discuss how the model may explain some features of real-world networks.
We argue that our assumption is realistic and hence worth studying, particularly in the
context of information network. Consider a firm in which employees’task is to communicate
with each other. In this network, there may be a center-like agent whose role is to collect and
distribute informations of other agents. Therefore, the quality of information flow depends on
the center’s communicating performance. Thus, it is likely that his performance declines as
contacts between him and other agents increase. In such context, each agent has to take into ac-
count that contacting the center damages the information flow. Hence, the value of information
he receives may not worth the efforts to contact. When this is the case, he may avoid contacting
the center by contacting another agent or staying disconnected from this network. At the same
time, the center may decline the contact initiated by an agent if the decline in his communi-
cating performance does not allow him to reap much benefit from the information that flows
through him.This problem is known as network congestion in the context of communication net-
works, where we call the first case. However, how this realism affects agents’ linking decision
has not been investigated in the literature in network formation to our knowledge. Thus, our
attempt to address this uninvestigated issue is the central contribution of this paper.
With this situation in mind, we address this network congestion issue by making the fol-
lowing modification to the two-way flow model of BG. Whenever information passes through
an agent, a quantity of information loss is incurred. The value of the remaining information
is decreasing and strictly concave in the amount of agent’s links 1. In contrast, in the original
model of BG, the quantity of information loss depends solely on the distance between agents.
Specifically, the original setting of BG is as follows. Each agent possesses a unique private piece
of information that is nonrival. He can choose to sponsor costly links to any agents without
their agreements. All links together form the network. If there is a link or a series of links be-
tween two agents, they are obliged to share their private informations. Thus, the decision of
1The justification of this stylized assumption is relegated to the model section.
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agent to form a link represents his decision to make his private information available to other
agents in exchange of receiving their informations, and concurrently his willingness to be an
information transmitting device.
Since we model this network congestion in a stylized way, we provide two justifications.
First, this model makes observing the effects of congestion avoidance easier. The original BG
model and our model permit each agent to access others without their agreements. This im-
plies that each agent decides on his own as to how to avoid the congestion he finds in the
network, hence easing the observation. This advantage is also facilitated by the assumption
that agents’information are nonrival 2. Second, because links are formed in a noncooperative
way, Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can be applied as the solution cencept. This eases the
analysis.
Despite, the one-sided access assumption has a major disadvantage. It implies that agent
cannot defend against an access by another agent, even when the access lowers his payoff. This
implication is not realistic. For example, in a file sharing network, one agent may decline an
access by another agent if the access lowers his internet speed. Hence, our model does not
provide an insight to this side of reality.
Based on the observation from the main results, two insights into the effects of network con-
gestion on the structure of real-world network can be learnt. First, when network congestion is
present, an equilibrium network may be fragmented, consisting of subnetworks disconnected
from each other. The intuition is that agent in one network may avoid entering another due
to the congestion. This may explain why empirical literature finds that disconnected networks
are common in the real world. Second, with network congestion, moving from a smaller net-
work to a larger one (a network with more agents) does not imply that the moving agent will
improve his payoffs. The intuition is that agents in a larger network may be more congested
(having more links), causing information to flow better in a smaller network. This may ex-
plain why real-world networks often consist of fragmented communities of notably different
sizes. For example, in a friendship network, some students may prefer to keep their friendship
within a small group rather than joining the crowd because they enjoy a stronger friendship
that provides a higher benefit flow. While our paper models network congestion in a stylized
way, this analysis may provide an alternative explanation of ‘social isolates’ observed in the
real world, suggesting that the underlying cause of such network feature may not necessarily
be heterogeneity among agents.These insights can be observed in our first proposition, which
finds that no nash network is connected under some restriction on the congestion parameter.
This disconnectedness is a sharp contrast to the result in the original model of BG that all Nash
Networks are connected.
2if assumed otherwise, it may be difficult to distinguish whether agent decides not to access another as a result
of the congestion or the rival nature of information.
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Beside the above disconnectedness, two results are also different from BG’s. First, Nash
Network in pure strategies do not exist under some parameters. This result is shown by an
example. Second, no stars are Nash except center-sponsored star 3.
Our paper contributes to the literature in network formation. This literature is pioneered
by the work of Jackson. and Wolinsky (1996)4. Their model assumes that two agents must
share a mutual consent in order that a link is established. A seminal work that contrasts to this
model is that of BG, in which one-sided link formation is assumed. Among existing extensions
of BG, the model of Caffarelli (2009) has in mind a situation in which managing too many links
simultaneously leads to information congestion. It assumes that the cost of link maintenance
increases in relation to the quantity of informations received. Hence, accessing an agent does
not directly damage the quality of information flow at the accessed agent. Our model differs in
that network congestion is reflected directly in the increasing information loss both the agent
being accessed and the accessing agent. This allows us to better observe the effects of congestion
avoidance. Beside this difference, Caffarelli (2009) assumes that information sharing is not two-
way, in that the the agent who forms link does not share his information with his partner.
2 The Model
N = {1, ..., n} is a set of agents and i and j are typical members of this set. Each agent
possesses a unique private piece of information that is valuable both to himself and anyone
who has an entry to it. Whenever i and j together share their informations, i has an entry to the
information of j and vice versa. However, the information transmission is made possible only
if a pairwise link between them is established.
Link establishment is costly and one-sided. i can spend the cost c to establish a link with
j without j’s consent. Therefore, a strategy of i is a set gi = (gi1, ..., gii−1, gii+1, ..., gin) where
gij ∈ {0, 1} and gij = 1 if and only if i formsj by paying c. In this case, we say that i accesses j.
We restrict our analysis to pure strategies throughout the paper. Let g = (g1, ..., gn) be a strategy
profile. The strategy space i is Gi and the set of all pure strategy profiles is G = {×Gi}ni=1.
To visualize how information flows among agents, a strategy profile g can be represented
by a network. Pictorially, a network consists of a set of nodes and a set of arrows pointing from
one node to another. To enable the network representation of a strategy profile, a one-to-one
correspondence between the set of all directed networks with n nodes and the set of strategy
ptofiles G is contructed by the following rule. In a network g, we enumerate the node from 1 to
3a star is a network in which there is a unique center-like agent who connects to all other agents. But all other
agents have no links with each other. A center-sponsored star is a star that the center sponsors the link to everyone.
4Jackson (2007) provides an overview of network formation literature
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n and let there be an arrow pointing from i to j if and only if i accesses j in the strategy profile
g. Therefore, we use the term network and strategy profile interchangably onwards. Figure 1
depicts an example of a network
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Figure 1: A network with five agents. n = 5, g1 = {1, 0, 0, 0} , g2 = {0, 1, 0, 0} , g3 =
{0, 0, 1, 0} , g4 = {0, 0, 0, 1} , g5 = {0, 0, 0, 0}
In a network, a link of i can be sponsored by himself or the other agent. Thus, to distinguish
the sponsorship, let N (i; g) = {k ∈ N|gik = 1} ∪ {i} be the set of all agents whom i accesses and
µi (g) ≡ |N (i; g)| − 1 be the number of links that i establishes. Notice that i ∈ N (i; g) because i
can access his own information 5. We indicate whether there is a link between i and j by the term
g¯ij = max
{
gij, gji
}
. Hence, g¯ij = 1 if and on if there is a link between i and j. In this case, we say
that i links with j. Similarly, we define N¯ (i; g) = {k ∈ N|g¯ik = 1}∪ {i} and µ¯i (g) ≡ |N¯ (i; g)| − 1.
An agent in N (i; g) and N¯ (i; g) is called directed neighbor and neighbor of i respectively.
With these notations, we turn to describe how information flows in a network. Apart from
the direct transmission via a single link, the information also flow indirectly via a series of links.
Formally, an ij-path is a sequence g¯i,j1 , g¯j1 j2 , ..., g¯jm j whose each element is 1, and is denoted by
Pij (g). The set of all Pij (g) is Pij (g). If an ij-path exists, we say that i observes j. Notice that the
existence of Pij guarantees the existence of Pji (g) = g¯jjm , g¯jm jm−1, ..., g¯j1i.
Ideally, if information is trasmitted and received perfectly by i, it gives i the payoff of 1.
However, throughout the transmission this value may decay. In this paper, we assume that
the decay is incurred nodewise. As the information traverses through agent i, the productivity
of i, σ (i; g), is the percentage rate at which the value is preserved. Hence, if the information
is transmitted through a path g¯i,j1 , g¯j1 j2 , ..., g¯jm j, the value of j’s information that i receives is
σ (i; g) σ (j1; g) σ (j2; g) ...σ (j; g) and is denoted by Vij. Figure 2 illustrates how the values of
information of other agents flow to agent 1 in the network of Figure 1.
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Figure 2: In the above network, V12 = σ1 (1) σ2 (2) = σ2,V13 = σ1 (1) σ2 (2) σ2 (3) = σ
2
2 ,V14 =
σ1 (1) σ2 (2) σ2 (3) σ2 (4) = σ
3
2 ,V15 = σ1 (1) σ2 (2) σ2 (3) σ2 (4) σ1 (5) = σ
3
2
If there are multiple ij-paths, the value of j’s information to i is given by the optimal paths.
Formally, let Pij (g) =
{
P1ij (g) , P
2
ij (g) , ..., P
L
ij (g)
}
be the set of all paths through which i ob-
serves j in a network g. The value of the information of j that i obtains in this network is
V¯ij (g) = max
k∈1,..,L
V(Pkij; g). We call a path that solves maxk∈1,..,LV(Pkij; g) an optimal ij-path. The set
5This assumption follows the convention set by the original model of BG.
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of all optimal paths is P¯ij (g). If there is no path through which i observes j, we let V¯ij (g) = 0.
For i’s own information, we let Vii = σ (i; g). That is, the decrease in his productivity also
decreases his own value of information 6.
Having defined the value of information, we are now ready to define the payoff of player i
from the strategy profile g in a game with n players. It is:
U
(
i; g
)
= ∑
j∈N
V¯ij
(
g
) − c · µi (g)
The first term on the right-hand side is the total value of information i receives in g or the
revenue of i in g and is denoted by Rev (i; g).
We point out a difference between our model and BG’s before adjourning this subsection.
This difference is in how information decays. In BG, the decay factor is assumed to be linkwise
and geometric. For example, let λ be this decay. If an ij-path consists of m links, then the infor-
mation of j decays to λm when it arrives to i. Hence, the aggregated decay of a path depends
solely on its length. In contrast, the decay in our model is defined nodewise, σ (i; g). Therefore,
two ij-paths with the same length may not provide the same value.
2.1 Assumptions on decay
Our key assumption is that the pdoductivity σ (i; g) depends solely on the number of i’s
links. To formalize this idea, let σ (i; g) be a function of µ¯i, ie., σ (i; g) : N → [0, 1], and the value
of σ (i; g) at µ¯i is σµ¯i (i; g). When omission is possible we simply write σ (i; g). Throughout the
paper, the following assumptions on σ (i; g) are assumed.
Assumption 1 (Concave Decreasing Decay). σ is decreasing and strictly concave in µ¯i. Moreover,
1. σ (i; g) = σ (j; g) if µ¯i = µ¯j
2. σ1 = 1
3. There exists a positive number K > 1 such that σx = 0 for any x ≥ K.
Let us justify these assumptions. The first assumption implies that agents are homogeneous
in productivity. Second, 2 implies that perfect communication when agent has one link. Finally,
the strict concavity implies that the decline in productivity increases at an increasing rate. While
there is no theoretical support, this assumption can be justified by some realistic scenarios. For
6For example, if agent’s own information is an unread newspaper article, then he has to put efforts to under-
stand it in order to receive the benefit. Hence, his productivity affects also his own value of information. This
assumption is also established in existing literature. Feri and Melendez-Jimenez (2009) assumes likewise.
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example, suppose that an agent stores all pieces of information in one place, then due to the
limitedness of space the chance that two pieces of information get mixed up, causing more
difficulties in communicating accurately is likely to increase at an increasing rate. Another
example is when each piece of information is very similar to one another, then the chance that
an agent does not know which is which is likely to increase at an increasing rate.
2.2 Network-related Definitions
This subsection introduces some properties of networks and definitions of special networks
that are frequently referred in the analysis. Our first definition captures the concept that two
networks can have the same structure even if links are not sponsored by the same agent.
Definition (Network Architecture). Let g1 and g2 be networks and N1 and N2 be their set of players,
g1 and g2 are said to have the same architecture if there exists a permutation pi : N1 → N2 such that
gij ∈ g1 if and only if gpi(i)pi(j) ∈ g2
Definition (subnetwork). Let g1 and g2 be networks and N1 and N2 be their set of agents, g1 is a
subnetwork of g2 if N
1 ⊂ N2 and g1 ⊂ g2
Definition (Connected network). a network g is connected if an ij-path exists for any i, j ∈ N.
Definition (component). Let g1 be a subnetwork of g2 and N1 and N2 be their set of agents, g1 is a
component of g2 if
1. g1 is connected
2. there exists no ij-path in g2 if i ∈ N1 and j ∈ N2
The above definition reflects that a network can be fragmented, having different subnet-
works that are disconnected from each other.
Definition (Minimal Network). a network is minimal if every ij-path is unique.
With the introduction of these properties, the followings are the definitions of some network
architectures.
Definition (Line). A network g is a line if there exists a permutation of m agents j1, ..., jm such that
g¯ =
{
g¯j1,j2 , g¯j2,j3 , ..., g¯jm−1jm
}
. Moreover, if there are m agents in a line, we say that its length is m− 1.
Definition (Empty network). A network is an empty network if every agent in it has no link.
Definition (Star). A network g is a star if
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1. there exists exactly one agent ic that has a link with every other agent;
2. for any two agents that are not ic, there is no link between them.
Moreover, if ic accesses everyone, we say that the star is a center-sponsored star.
2.3 Nash Networks
Given a network g, if we remove all the links that i establishes, the network that remains is
a collection of the strategies of all other agents except i. Denote this remaining network by g−i.
We write g = gi ⊕ g−i to emphasize that a network g can be formed by the union of g−i and gi.
We use these notations to introduce to following definitions.
Definition (Best response). A strategy gi is a best response of i to g−i if
U
(
i; gi ⊕ g−i
) ≥ U (i; g′i ⊕ g−i) , for all g′i ∈ Gi
Definition (Nash network). A network g is a Nash network if gi is a best response to g−i for every
agent i ∈ N.
We remark the following relation between Nash Network and its architecture. If a network
is Nash, so are all networks that have the same architecture. This relation is used tostate the
results in the next section.
3 Main Results
Our goal is to identify Nash Networks and their properties. For σ2 ≤ 12 , Nash network
exists regardless to the cost range and number of players. Proposition 1 also provides a full
equilibrium characterziation. In contrast, for σ2 >
1
2 , Nash Network always does not exist. We
provide an example that shows the nonexistence and study some properties of minimal Nash
network in Proposition 2, 3 and 4.
Proposition 1. 1. If σ2 ≤ 12 , Nash network exists for any cost c and number of players n. Moreover,
any component in it is one of the following three types.
• a three-agent line whose central agent does not establish a link, ie., network (a) in Figure 3
• a two-agent line, ie., network (b) in Figure 3
• an isolated agent, ie., network (c) in Figure 3
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Three types of components in a Nash network, given that σ2 ≤ 12
2. Using the network (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 3, the set of nash networks for each set of parameters
c and σ2 is given below.
• If c > 1 and σ2 =
1
2 , then the empty network is the unique Nash.
• If c ≤ 1 and σ2 = 12 , then the set of Nash networks consists of networks that have the following
architectures:
– the empty network
– the network with the following properties: (1) each component is either (a) or (b) or (c); and
(2) at most one component is (c)
• If c > 1 and σ2 <
1
2 , then the empty network is the unique Nash.
• If c = 1 and σ2 <
1
2 , then the set of Nash networks consists of all networks that have the following
architectures:
– the empty network
– the network with the following properties: (1) each component is either (b) or (c); and (2) at
most one component is (c)
• If 2σ2 < c < 1, then the set of Nash networks consists of the networks whose architecture has the
following properties: (1) each component is either (b) or (c); and (2) at most one component is (c)
• If c ≤ 2σ2 < 1, then the set of Nash networks consists of the networks that have the following
architectures:
– at most one component is (c), the rest of the components are (b)
– each component is (a) or (b)
A noticable feature of Nash Networks in Proposition 1 is that none of them are connected,
given that n > 3. This is a sharp contrast to Proposition 5.3 and its generalization by Jaegher
and Kamphorst (2008) that show that every Nash Networks is connected. What drives this
contrast? The result in BG relies on the following intuition: if i believes that the component he is
accessing provides more benefit than another component that j is accessing, then j’s deviation
is to leave his component and enter the component of i. By this deviation, j receives at least
as much as the payoff of i. However, under the concave decreasing decay assumption, this
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ij
k
l
m
Figure 4: A nash network with five agents for c = 2σ2 < 1
reasoning is not valid. Whenever j enters the component of i, he is increasing the congestion
at the node being accessed. The congestion may cause the information flow to be very low.
Hence, there is no guarantee that his payoff will improve. The following example clarifies this
intuition by showing what happens when the constant decay assumption in BG is replaced by
our assumption.
Example 1. Consider the Nash network for c = 2σ2 < 1 in Figure 4. Suppose that a decay on each link
is a constant λ < 1 as in BG. k’s gain from accessing l is λ + λ2 while i’s gain from accessing j is λ.
Therefore, i is better off imitating the strategy of k by accessing l instead of j. This imitating deviation of
i gives him the gain of λ + 2λ2 and rules out this network to be Nash.
We now replace the constant λ by our assumption that 2σ2 = c < 1 and show that the same imitating
strategy is no longer a positive deviation, causing this network to remain a candidate for Nash network.
Define the gain from accessing an agent as the total information value that arrives from that agent. As
opposed to the above case, the gain of i from accessing j, σ (j) = 1, is higher than the gain of k from
accessing l, 2σ2 = σ2 (l) + σ2 (l) σ1 (m). Moreover, because σ3 = 0, i’s payoff becomes 0 if he imitates the
strategy of k by accessing l. Therefore, such imitating strategy does not improve i’s payoff. In addition,
neither accessing k or m will improve his payoff because σ2 <
1
2 .
On the other hand, can k improve his payoff by imitating the strategy of i? If k accesses j instead
of l, his gain is 2σ2 = σ2 (j) + σ2 (j) σ1 (i). Because the gain from accessing j is equal to the gain from
accessing l, this imitating strategy is not a positive deviation of k.
Contrary to Proposition 1, if σ2 >
1
2 , Nash network does not exist for some parameters c and
n. An example which shows the nonexistence is given below. While the proof is relegated to
the appendix, an intution is hereby provided. The non-existence stems from that σ (i; g) of any
agent i changes in a discrete way. In other words, whenever an agent deviates from his strategy,
the productivities of involved agents decrease or increase discretely. Hence, for some σ, c and n,
it may turn out that there exists an agent who finds a positive deviation in any given network.
Example 2. Given that 1√
2
> σ2 >
1
2 , σ3 = 0, and c = 0.98, no network with 5 agents is Nash.
The second proposition below gives a noticable property that two single-neighbor agents
never access the same center-like agent in a minimal Nash network. This result is driven by
congestion avoidance: a single-neighbor agent avoids the center and access another single-
neighbor agent instead. Such avoidance is profitable because σ2 >
1
2 guarantees a sufficiently
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low congestion at the agent being accessed. The consequence is that every link between a
single-neighbor agent and the center is sponsored by the center in equilibrium. Formally, call a
single-neighbor agent, end node, the agent who is his neighbor parent, and an agent who has no
link isolated node. We use these terms to state Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Given that σ2 >
1
2 and n > 3
7. In a minimal Nash network g, let j be an end node and
i be his parent,
1. if j accesses i, j is the only end node of i;
2. if i accesses j, i accesses all his end nodes. Morover, if he has more than one end node, then he
accesses all his neighbors, including ones that are not end nodes.
The same intuition above is also applied to prove Proposition 3. Informally, If there are two
centers, i and k, who access their end nodes, i will find that accessing an end node of k is more
profitable than accessing his own end node. The reason is that accessing his end node provides
him only one piece of information, while accessing an end node of k provide multiple pieces,
yet with a higher congestion. Such deviation becomes profitable if the higher connection at k is
not too high, which is guaranteed by σ2 >
1
2 .
Proposition 3. Given that σ2 >
1
2 , if g is a minimal Nash network, g has at most one component that
contains a parent who accesses all his neighbors.
The power of Proposition 2 and 3 is that they rule out many minimal networks to be Nash
regardless to σ, c and n. For example, a network that consists of two disconnected center-
sponsored stars cannot be Nash because one center will find a positive deviation by accessing
an end node of the other center. Figure 5 illustrates some networks that are ruled out.
As a result of Proposition 2, the only star that remains a candidate for Nash Network is the
center-sponsored star. This result differs from Proposition 5.3 in BG which shows that all kinds
of stars are Nash under some range of decay. Proposition 4 below provides a neccessary and
sufficient condition for a center-sponsored star to be Nash. This condition involves a restriction
on σ and n. Figure 6 gives an example of parameters that satisfie this restriction.
Proposition 4. Given that n > 3, let g be a star network
1. If g is not a center-sponsored star, g is not nash
7if n ≤ 3, this proposition does not apply. Every component of nash network is either a line or empty. The
proof is trivial and is omitted
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 5: Networks that are ruled out to be Nash according to Propositon 2 and 3
Figure 6: Nash Network with n = 5, c = 0.5, σ5 = 0.9, σ4 = 0.969 σ3 = 0.9799 σ2 = 0.99 σ1 = 1
2. If g is a center-sponsored star, the following inequalities are neccessary and sufficient condtions for
g to be nash:
σn−1− (n− 1) (σn−2− σn−1) ≥ c ≥ (σ2)2 − σn−1− (1− σ2) (1 + (n− 2) σn−1)
Beside center-sponsored star, line is also a network architecture that is Nash for some σ, c
and n. Figure 7 exemplifies two lines that are Nash.
(a) n = 6, c = 0.2, σ2 =
0.97, σ3 = 0.2, σ4 = σ5 = σ6 = 0
(b) n = 4, c = 0.3, σ2 = 0.9, σ3 = 0.5, σ4 = 0
Figure 7: Two lines that are Nash
4 Discussions
This section observes two features of Nash Networks in this model that differ from those
in BG. These features results from that the constant decay assumption of BG is replaced by
concave decreasing productivity. Intuitions and discussions on how these features are likely to
be exhibited in real-world settings are also provided.
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4.1 Network congestion may lead equilibrium networks to be disconnected
The first observation comes from that all Nash networks for σ2 ≤ 12 are disconnected (Propo-
sition 1). The intuition, which is made clear by Example 1, can be summarized as follows. While
establishing a link to an agent is a way to access a component, it also increases the congestion at
the agent being accessed. This congestion may cause much loss in the information transmitted
via the agent. When such congestion, or inefficieny in information transmission, is sufficiently
high, agent may be better off avoiding the congestion altogether and remaining disconnected
from the component.
How does this observation help understand real-world phenomena? Our model may serve
as a hypothesis that explains why empirical evidences find that real-world networks are often
disconnected 8. For example, if a society is considered as a network in which information is
exchanged among agents, it is likely that the society is fragmented into small communities if
agents find that avoiding connecting to each other is a way to reduce inefficiency in information
flow.
4.2 Connecting to a larger component does not imply a higher gain
Our second observation is that a smaller component may provide a higher gain to their
members than a larger one. The observation comes from that many nash networks in Proposi-
tion 1 consists of components whose size, or the number of agents, are not equal. Consider, for
example, the equilibrium network in Example 1. Observe that i chooses to access an isolated
agent j rather than someone in the larger component. If i accesses j, j’s productivity is σ1. If i
accesses someone in the larger component, the productivity of the accessed agent is at most σ2.
Hence, if σ2 is sufficiently lower than σ1, then entering a larger component gives i a lower gain.
This observation may explain why there are agents who prefer to reside in a smaller com-
munity rather than a larger one in a real-world social network. When link is a source of in-
efficiency, a smaller community that has less connections may provide a higher benefit to the
participating members such that they do not want to join a crowded community. In other
words, agents may face a tradeoff between quantity of information and quality of information
when network congestion is present. While a larger community may have more information,
the quality of information may be deterred if agents possess too many connections. A friend-
ship network among students may serve as an example of this hypothesis. Some students may
choose to maintain their friendships within a smaller group and avoid contacting the crowd
because they enjoy a stronger tie of friendship.
8For instance, Ennett and Bauman (2000) observes that a common feature of friendship networks is that there
are agents who are social isolate, disconnecting themselves from the principal component. R. Kumar and Tomkins
(2010) also finds that some online social networks contain isolated communities.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides a stylized model with two key assumptions. First, link can be formed
without a mutual consent between agents. Second, link addition increases the congestion, or
more information loss, at the accessed agent and the agent who accesses. The model allows us
to see how an agent may avoid accessing other agents due to an increasing congestion. The two
key assumptions lead to equilibrium networks that are disconnected. Moreover, nonexistence
of equilibrium network in pure strategies arises under some parameters. These two features
are different from the results in the original setting of Bala and Goyal (2000) from which this
model is developed.
References
BALA, V., AND S. GOYAL (2000): “A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation,” Economet-
rica, 68(5), 1181–1230.
CAFFARELLI, F. (2009): “Networks with decreasing returns to linking,” Economics Working
Papers ECO2004/18, Bank of Italy.
ENNETT, S., AND K. BAUMAN (2000): Increasing Prevention Effectivenesschap. Adolescent Social
Networks: Friendship Cliques, Social Isolates, and Drug Use Risk, pp. 83 – 92. Tanglewood
Research, Inc.
FERI, F., AND M. A. MELENDEZ-JIMENEZ (2009): “Coordination in Evolving Networks with
Endogenous Decay,”Working Papers 2009-19, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University
of Innsbruck.
JACKSON, M. (2007): The Missing Links: Formation and Decay of Economic Networkschap. 2: The
Study of Social Networks in Economics, pp. 19–40. Russell Sage Foundation.
JACKSON., M., AND A. WOLINSKY (1996): “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Net-
works,” Journal of Economic Theory, 71(1), 44–74.
JAEGHER, K. D., AND J. KAMPHORST (2008): “Network formation with decreasing marginal
benefits of information,” Working Papers 08-16, Utrecht School of Economics.
R. KUMAR, J. N., AND A. TOMKINS (2010): Link Mining: Models, Algorithms, and Applica-
tionschap. Structure and Evolution of Online Social Networks, p. 611âA˘S¸617. Sprin.
14
A Appendix
This appendix covers all the proofs in this paper. We begin by introducing some concepts
and a lemma.
A.1 The Concepts of Marginal Cost and Marginal Revenue
Let us introduce two concepts that will be used to simplify the equilibrium analyses. Given
a network g, by identifying that an agent i has a profitable deviation by adding or destroying
just one link, we can show that g is not in equilibrium. Most of our analyses rest upon this
proving technique. Let g + ij = g ∪ gij and g− ij = g\gij be the networks corresponding to the
addition and deletion of gij respectively.
When i adds gij , this new link may give an entry to some new agents that are not i’s
neighbor in g. At the same time, via gij, i may find a new path through which he observes the
neighbors that pre-exist in g. For some neighbors, a new path may yield a higher payoff than
the optimal one that i uses when he is in g. Therefore, as g changes to g + ij, the optimal path to
reach some pre-existing neighbors may also change. We denote the set of such new agents and
the set of such pre-existing neighbors of i by Ni (g, g + ij) = {j ∈ N|j ∈ Ni (g + ij) ∧ j /∈ Ni (g)}
and Mi (g, g + ij) =
{
j ∈ Ni (g) |P¯ij (g) ∩ P¯ij (g + ij) = ∅
}
, where P¯ij (g) is defined as in section
2, respectively. The example below illustrates how Ni (g, g + ij) and Mi (g, g + ij) are identified.
Example 3. Consider Figure 8. Ni (g, g + ij) = ∅, because i finds no new neighbor in g+ ij. Mi (g, g + ij) =
{j, 3}, because P¯ij (g) =
{
g¯i1, g¯12, g¯23, g¯3j
}
but P¯ij (g + ij) =
{
g¯ij
}
and P¯i3 (g) = {g¯i1, g¯12, g¯23} but
P¯ij (g + ij) =
{
g¯ij, g¯j3
}
j321i
(a) Network g
j321i
(b) Network g + ij
Figure 8: Example 3
With these notations, we are ready to introduce the concept ofmarginal revenue, which sums
together the additional benefit of i when he adds gij to g
Definition (Marginal Revenue). Let Ni (g, g + ij) and Mi (g, g + ij) be defined as above, the marginal
revenue of i when adding gij to g is
MR
(
i; gij → g
)
= ∑
k∈Ni(g,g+ij)
V¯ik
(
g + ij
)
+ ∑
k∈Mi(g,g+ij)
(
Vik
(
g + ij
) − Vik (g))
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The first summation answers how much i gains from having entries to the new neighbors.
The second summation quantifies how much i gains from having new optimal paths in g + ij
as compared to the old one in g. Observe that Vik (g + ij) − Vik can be negative due to the
decreasing productivity of i. Hence, MR
(
i; gij → g
)
can be negative.
Example 4. In Figure 8, because Mi (g, g + ij) = {j, 3} and Ni (g, g + ij) = ∅, MR (g, g + ij) =(
σ2 (i; g + ij) σ2 (j; g + ij)− σ1 (i; g) σ2 (1; g) σ2 (2; g) σ2 (3; g) σ1 (j; g)
)
+(
σ2 (i; g + ij) σ2 (j; g + ij) σ2 (3; g + ij)−σ1 (i; g) σ2 (1; g) σ2 (2; g) σ2 (3; g)
)
=
(
σ22 − σ32
)
+
(
σ32 − σ32
)
We now introduce the concept of marginal cost. As the network changes from g to g + ij,
there are neighbors of i that he still uses the same optimal path to reach them. The set of these
neighbors is Ni (g) \Mi (g, g + ij). Inspite of the same optimal paths, the information’s value
that reach to i decreases due to the decreasing productivity of i that results from adding the
new link. The decreasing value, together with link establishment cost c, are the marginal cost
formalized below.
Definition (Marginal Cost). Let Mi (g, g + ij) be defined as above, the marginal cost of i from adding
gij to g is MC
(
i; gij → g
)
= c + ∑Ni(g)\M(g,g+ij)
(
V¯ij (g)−
(
V¯ij (g + ij)
))
Example 5. In Figure 8, because Mi (g, g + ij) = {j, 1} and Ni (g, g + ij) = ∅, MC
(
i; gij → g
)
=
(σ1 (i; g)−σ2 (i; g + ij) )+ (σ1 (i; g) σ2 (3; g)−σ2 (i; g + ij) σ2 (3; g + ij) )+ (σ1 (i; g) σ2 (3; g) σ2 (2; g)−
σ2 (i; g + ij) σ2 (3; g + ij) σ2 (2; g + ij) )
Remark. While MC is defined as above, the fact that i’s productivity decreases is not expressed ex-
plicitly in the definition. By simple algebraic rearrangement, it can be expressed as MC
(
i; gij → g
)
=(
σµi(g) − σµi(g)+1
)(
∑k∈Ni(g)\Mi(g,g+ij) V¯ik (g) · 1σµi(g)
)
. One can think of V¯ik (g) · 1σµi(g) as the value
of information of k that arrives to i, without taking i’s own productivity into consideration. Hence,
this term remains the same, while the only change as g becomes g + ij, which is the productivity of i, is
expressed as σµi(g) − σµi+1(g).
To use the MR and MC in the equilibrium analysis, we finally needs to show that i wants to
deviate from the network g by adding gij if he finds thatMR
(
i; gij → g
)
exceedsMC
(
i; gij → g
)
.
The following lemma serves this purpose.
Lemma 1. U (i; g + ij)−U (i; g) = MR (i; gij → g)−MC (i; gij → g)
Proof. By the definition of Ni (g, g + ij) and Mi (g, g + ij), Ni (g + ij) = Ni (g) unionsq Ni (g, g + ij) and
Ni (g) = (Ni (g) \Mi (g, g + ij)) unionsqMi (g, g + ij). Therefore, Ui (g + ij) = Ui (g) +K if and only if
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∑
k ∈Mi(g,g+ij)
V¯ik
(
g + ij
)
+ ∑
k ∈Ni(g)\Mi(g,g+ij)
V¯ik
(
g + ij
)
+ ∑
k∈Ni(g,g+ij)
V¯ik
(
g + ij
)
+ µdi
(
g + ij
) · c = ∑
k∈Mi(g,g+ij)
V¯ik
(
g
)
+ ∑
k∈Ni(g)\Mi(g,g+ij)
V¯ik
(
g
)
+ µdi
(
g
) · c + K
Rearranging the inequality,
∑
k ∈Mi(g,g+ij)
(
V¯ik
(
g + ij
) − V¯ik (g)
)
+ ∑
k ∈Ni(g,g+ij)
V¯ik
(
g + ij
)
= c + ∑
k∈Ni(g)\M(g,g+ij)
(
V¯ik
(
g
) − V¯ik (g + ij)
)
+ K
Observe that the left-hand side is MR
(
i; gij → g
)
and the right-hand side is MC
(
i; gij → g
)
+ K.
Therefore, U (i; g + ij)−U (i; g) = MR (i; gij → g)−MC (i; gij → g)
Remark. While the above lemma shows whether i has a profitable deviation by adding gij to g, it can
also be used to show whether i has a profitable deviation by deleting gij in g. To do so, replace the term
MC
(
i; gij → g
)
and MR
(
i; gij → g
)
with MC
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
and MR
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
in the
above proof. This gives another version of the lemma: U (i; g)−U (i; g− ij) = MR (i; gij → g− ij)−
MC
(
i; gij → g− ij
)
.
A.2 Proofs of the propositions
Proof (Proof of Proposition 1). The strategy of this proof is to first eliminate all networks that have an
agent with a positive deviation, and then identify which of the non-eliminated networks are Nash given
c and σ2. For convenience, type A, B and C component in the proof refers to the network (a), (b) and (c)
in Figure 3.
Step 1: If a network g has an agent who has more than two links, g is not nash. Let this
agent be i. Observe that σ3 = σ4 = ... = 0 because σ2 ≤ 12 and σ is strictly concave. Therefore, i’s
productivity σ (i; g) = σµi(g) is 0 because he has more than two links. Because σ (i; g) = 0 and i is
on every ij-path, V
(
Pij; g
)
= ∏k∈N(Pij) σ (k; g) = 0 for any j that is a neighbor of i. As a result, the
revenue of i, ∑j∈N V¯ij (g), is 0. Therefore, if i accesses some agent in this network, he will want to remove
it because the link establishment is costly but his revenue is 0. Moreover, if i is accessed by a neighbor j,
j will also want to remove the link for the same reason. Because of these deviations, g is not nash.
Step 2: For any network g that is not ruled out by Step 1, if it contains a component that
is not one of the three networks in Figure 3, it is not nash. Such component is either a cycle or a
line that is neither (a) nor (b) in Figure 3. In what follows, we show that there is an agent who wants to
deviate from such component.
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i = 1 j = n’2 n’-1
b
Figure 9: A cycle with n′ agents, enumerated from left to right.
Step 2.1: Suppose that this component is a cycle with n′ agents. Denote this cycle agents by gcy.
In gcy, consider an agent i that establishes at least one link gij. Observe that if i removes gij the cycle
becomes a line. Denote this line by gli. We will show that the payoff of i in gli is greater than his payoff
in gcy.
Consider the value of information that flows to i in gcy. Enumerate the agents in gcy according to
Figure 9. For any k, there are two ik-paths. One is by using the same path that i uses when he is in the
line, ie. when there is no gij. The other one is to retrieve the information of k via the new link gij. Let V
old
ik
and Vnewik denote the value of information from the two paths. Because every node in the cycle has produc-
tivity σ2, V
old
ik = (σ2)
k and Vnewik = (σ2)
n−k+2. Therefore, MR
(
i; gij → g− ij
)
is ∑nk> n+22 +2
V¯ik (g
cy) =
∑
n
k> n+22
Vnewik because V
new
ik > V
old
ik for n ≥ k > n+22 . We now turn to find MC
(
i; gij → g− ij
)
.
Because Vnewik ≤ Voldik for k ≤ n+22 , MC
(
i; gij → g− ij
)
= c + (1− σ2)
(
1
σ2
) (
∑k≤ n+22 V
old
ik
)
. Hence,
MC
(
i; gij → g− ij
)
> MR
(
i; gij → g− ij
)
because σ2 ≤ 12 . Applying Lemma 1 to this inequality,
we conclude that i is strictly better off by deleting gij. Therefore, i has a positive deviation.
Step 2.2: Suppose that this component is a line network that is neither (a) nor (b) in Figure 3.
Denote this component by gline. Consider all agents that have exactly two links. Among them, there
exists at least one agent who establish one or two links. In what follows we aim to show that such agent
is strictly better off by deleting exactly one link, breaking the line into two disconnected lines.
We let this agent be i and a link that he establishes be gij. Without gij, i is disconnected from
the line that contains j, denote the component that contains j by gj and the other component, which
contains i, by gi. Suppose that there are n′ agents in gj, the total benefit from estaliblishing gij is
MR
(
i; gij → gline− ij
)
= σ2
(
i; gline
)
σ1
(
j; gline
)
= σ2 if n
′ = 1 and MR
(
i; gij → gline− ij
)
=
∑
n′
k=1 V¯l,k = ∑
n′−1
k=1 σ
k
2σ2
(
i; gline
)
+ σn
′−1
2 σ2
(
i; gline
)
. In relation to MR
(
i; gij → gline− ij
)
, the total
cost for establishing the link is MC
(
i; gij → gline− ij
)
, which we now identify a lower bound. Beside
the cost c, i’s productivity drops from σ1 = 1 to σ2 if he establishes gij. Therefore, the lower bound
MC
(
i; gij → gline− ij
)
is MC = c + (σ1 − σ2) = c + (1− σ2). Because σ2 ≤ 12 , MC > 12 but
MR
(
i; gij → gline− ij
) ≤ 12 . Therefore, MR (i; gij → gline− ij) < MC (i; gij → gline− ij). Apply-
ing Lemma 1 to this inequality, we conclude that U
(
i; gline− ij) < U (i; gline) = U (i; g). Hence, i is
strictly better off by deleting gij.
Step 3: Equilibrium characterizations. By step 2, a nash network consists of components that is
either type A, B or C. Thus, this step’s goal is to shown exactly which combination of these three kinds
of components composes a Nash Network for a given c and σ2. To achieve this goal, it is neccessary to
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identify exactly which combination gives an existence of an agent who has a positive deviation and which
does not. Because checking all such deviations can be cumbersome, our strategy is the following. We first
identify all kinds of deviations that are never positive, regardless of c and σ2. This allows us to pin down
only some deviations that need to be checked by quantifying the payoff of the deviating agent.
First, choose any network whose each component is either type A, B or C. We will show that any
deviation such that the deviating agent has more than one link is never positive. Consider a deviation in
which the deviating agent has two links. Because all other agents in the network have at most two links,
the deviation makes him a part of a line or a cycle. If he is in a cycle, in step 2 we show that the agent’s
payoff is strictly higher if he removes the link and remain in a line. Similarly, if he is in a line, in step 2 we
show that his payoff is stricly higher if he removes the link, breaking the line into two disconnected ones.
Therefore, applying step 2, any deviation such that the deviating agent has two links is never positive.
Now consider, instead, a deviation such that the deviating agent has more than two links. In step 1, we
have shown that such deviation yields the zero revenue to himself because his productivity is 0 while he
has to pay for the link establishment cost. Therefore, any deviation such that the deviating agent has
more than one link is never positive.
we now further eliminate some combinations that are not Nash for some given parameters. For c < 1,
any combination that has more than one component that is type C is not nash. Type C component is an
isolated agent. Let the isolated agents be i and j. If i access j, his payoff is 1 + (1− c). If i does not access
j, he remains isolated and his payoff is 1. Therefore, if c < 1 and there are more than one isolated agents
(two type C components), it is not nash because one isolated agent will deviate by accessing another.
Hence, there is at most one type C component in a Nash network if c < 1.
Using these results, we list all the networks that remain candidates for Nash Networks below. All of
them are combinations whose each component is type A, B or C
1. all components are C (only for c ≥ 1)
2. at least one A, at least one B, exactly one C
3. at least one A, at least one B, no C
4. all A, no B, exactly one C
5. all A, no B, no C
6. all B, no C
7. all B, exactly one C
We now list all possible deviations in these combinations. Exploiting the above result that a deviation
such that the deviating agent has more than one link is never positive, Figure 10, 11, 12 show all possible
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one-link deviations which orginate from an agent in type A, B and C component respectively. In Figure
10, 11, The first three deviations are such that the agent removes himself from the component and access
another component. The dotted line shows the link that is removed and the arrow-headed link shows the
decision to access another component. The last deviation is the deviation such that the agent removes
himself from the component and becomes isolated. In Figure 12, because type C component is an isolated
agent, there are three possible deviations - accessing type A, B and C component.
Finally, because a combination in the list is Nash if and only if there is no positive deviation, whether
the combination is nash depends on whether the existence of any deviation that gives a higher payoff than
the payoff from the no-deviating strategy, given c and σ2. To identify the existence, tables in Figure 10,
11, and 12 compare the payoff of the deviating agent when he does not deviate with the payoff when he
deviates. Therefore, for a given a set of parameters c and σ2, applying this table to identify whether each
combination in the above list is Nash gives us the set of Nash Networks, which completes the proof.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Deviation from-deviation payoff no-deviation payoff
(a) 2σ22 + σ2 + 1− c 2σ2 + 1− c
(b) 2σ2 + 1− c 2σ2 + 1− c
(c) 2− c 2σ2 + 1− c
(d) 1 2σ2 + 1− c
Figure 10: Deviations in type A component
(a) (b)
(c)
(d)
Deviation from-deviation payoff no-deviation payoff
(a) 2σ2 + 1− c 2− c
(b) 2− c 2− c
(c) 2σ22 + σ2 + 1− c 2− c
(d) 1 2− c
Figure 11: Deviations in type B component
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(a)
(b) (c)
Deviation from-deviation payoff no-deviation payoff
(a) 2σ2 + 1− c 1
(b) 2σ22 + σ2 + 1− c 1
(c) 2− c 1
Figure 12: Deviations in type C component
Proof (Proof of Proposition 2). The proof is divided into two parts according to the two properties in
the proposition.
Part 1: If j accesses i, j is the only end node of i. We prove by the following contradiction. Suppose
there exists another end node k of i in a minimal network g, this end node has a postive deviation by
removing the link with i and establish a link with the end node j instead. Formally, let g′ be the network
with such deviation of k and gc be the component that k and j reside. Observe that k spends only one
unit of link establishment cost c both in g and g′. Therefore, to show that U (k; g) < U (k; g′), it suffices
to show that Rev (k; g) < Rev (k; g′) in what follows.
Consider Rev (k; g). We can decompose Rev (k; g) in the following way. While all the information
of every agent in the component gc flows to k via gik, we can partition all agents in g
c in to three sets
and will decompose Rev (k; g) accordingly. Let N1, N2 and N3 be the three sets. Let N1 consists only
the agent j, N2 consists of all end nodes of i except j and k, and N3 consists of the rest of the agents
in gc except k. Moreover, let Vk
(
Np; g
)
and V¯k
(
Np; g
′), be the sum of V¯kl (k; g) and Vkl (k; g), where
l ∈ {Np}. We express Vk (N1; g) and Vk (N2; g) as follows.
Vk
(
N1; g
)
= σ1
(
j
)
σµi(g)σ1 (k) (i)
Vk
(
N2; g
)
=
(
µi
(
g
) − 3) σ1σµi(g)σ1 (k)
Therefore,
Rev
(
k; g
)
= σµi(g) +
(
µi
(
g
) − 3) σµi(g) + Vk (N3; g)
Similarly, we express Vk (N1; g
′) and Vk (N2; g′) as follows.
Vk
(
N1; g
′) = σ2 (j) σ1 (k)
To express Vk (N2; g
′), we use the fact that σ (i; g′) = σµi(g)−1 because k removes the link he has with i
in g.
Vk
(
N2; g
′) = σ2 (j) (µi (g) − 3) σ (i; g′) σ1 (k)
= σ2
(
j
) (
µi
(
g
) − 3) σµi(g)−1σ1 (k)
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Therefore,
Rev
(
k; g′
)
= σ2 + σ2σµi(g)−1
(
µi
(
g
) − 3) + Vi (N3; g′)
In the expression of Rev (k; g′) and Rev (k; g) above, the only terms left unexpressed are Vk (N3; g′)
and Vk (N3; g). Therefore, in order to check whether Rev (k; g) < Rev (k; g
′) and finish the proof, we
need to find a relation between Vk (N3; g
′) and Vk (N3; g). This relation is expressed below.
(1)Vk
(
N3; g
′) = Vk (N3; g) 1
σµi
(
g
)σµi(g)−1σ2 (j)
We now explain how the relation is derived. Consider how information of an agent in the set N3
flows to k in g and g′. The flows of information, in both networks, have to pass through i. The only two
differences in the flow, however, are the followings. While the information flows to i and finally reaches k
in g, it flows to i, then j and finally k in g′. Hence, the term σ2 (j; g′) apprears on the right hand side of
the expression. Moreover, the productivity of i in g is σµi(g) while it is σµi(g)−1 in g
′ because k removes
his link that he establishes with i in g. This change in productivty of i appears as the term 1
σµi (g)
σµi(g)−1.
By these two differences in the flow of information of agents in the set N3, we have the above relation.
Having found the above relation, to finish the proof it remains to show that Rev (k; g′) > Rev (k; g).
(2a)Rev
(
k; g′
)
= σ2 + σ2σµi(g)−1
(
µi
(
g
) − 3) + Vi (N3; g) 1
σµi
(
g
)σµi(g)−1σ2
(2b)Rev
(
k; g
)
= σµi(g) +
(
µi
(
g
) − 3) σµi(g) + Vi (N3; g)
Therefore, Rev (k; g′) > Rev (k; g) if and only if
(2c)σ2 + σ2σ(µi(g)−1)
(
µi
(
g
) − 3) + Vi (N3; g) 1
σµi
(
g
)σµi(g)−1σ2
> σµi(g) +
(
µi
(
g
) − 3) σµi(g) + Vi (N3; g)
Rearranging the inequality,
(2d)Vi
(
N3; g
) ( 1
σµi
(
g
)σµi(g)−1σ2 − 1
)
+
(
σ2 − σµi(g)
)
+
(
µi
(
g
) − 3) (σµi(g)−1σ2 − σµi(g)
)
> 0
Observe that the second term on the left-hand side is positive. Moreover, The first and the third are
also postive because
σµi(g)−1
σµi(g)
> σ2σ1 due to the assumption that σ is concave. Because all the terms on the
left-hand side is positive, the inequality above is valid and Rev (k; g′) > Rev (k; g).
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Part 2: If i accesses j, i accesses all his end nodes. Morover, if he has more than one end node, he
accesses all his neighbors, including ones that are not end nodes.
For the first part, that i accesses all his end nodes, the proof is identical to the proof of Part 1. That is,
if k is an end node that accesses i in g, k has a positive deviation by removing the link with i and accesses
j instead.
We now consider the second part, that if he has more than one end node, he accesses all his neighbors.
The proof follows the same strategy as the proof of Part 1. Formally, let o be a neighbor that is not an end
node of i. Suppose, by contradiction, that o accesses i in the network g. Our goal is to show that o has
a positive deviation by deleting the link with i and accesses j. Let g′ be the network with such deviation
of o. As with the proof of Part 1, by Lemma 1 it suffices to show that Rev (o; g) < Rev (o; g′) in what
follows.
Let N1 be the set of all agents, except o and j, in the component that o belongs. Let Vo (N1; g) =
∑p∈N1 V¯op (g) and Vo (N1; g
′) = ∑p∈N1 V¯op (g
′). We express Rev (o; g′) and Rev (o; g) below.
Rev
(
o; g
)
= σ1
(
j
)
σµi(g) (i) σ
(
o; g
)
+ Vo
(
N1; g
)
+ σ
(
o; g
)
Rev
(
o; g′
)
= σ2
(
j
)
σµi(g)−1 (i) σ
(
o; g′
)
+ Vo
(
N1; g
′) + σ (o; g)
, where that σ (o; g) = σ (o; g′) because o deviates from g to g′ by accessing j instead of i.
Hence, to show that Rev (o; g) < Rev (o; g′) , it remains to find a relation between Vo (N1; g′) and
Vo (N1; g). This relation is expressed below using the same reasoning for the Equation 1 of Part 1.
Vo
(
N1; g
′) = Vo (N1; g) 1
σµi
(
g
)σµi(g)−1σ2 (j)
Having found this relation, we apply a calculation similar to those in the equations 2 to show that
Rev (o; g) < Rev (o; g′), which finishes the proof.
Proof (Proof of Proposition 3). We prove by contradiction. Let g′ and g′′ be components that contain
a parent who supports all his neighbors. Let i and k be such parents in g′ and g′′ respectively. Let j and
l be end nodes of i and k. Our proof aims to show that i has an incentive to remove the link with j and
accesses l instead. Our proof is composed of three cases: (1) k has only one neighbor, (2) k has exactly
two neighbors, (3) k has more than two neighbors.
Case 1 Let g = gi ⊕ g−i. We introduce another strategy of i, g˜i =
{
gi\
{
gij
}} ∪ {gil}, which is gi
with the only modification that i accesses l instead of j. Let g˜ = g˜i ⊕ g−i. With these notations, in what
follows we show that gi is not a best response of i to g−i because Ui (g˜i ⊕ g−i) > Ui (gi ⊕ g−i).
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To show this inequality, by lemma 1, it suffices to show that MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) >
MR
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
. This is because
MC
((
g− ij) + il) = MC ((g − ij) + ij)
= c +
(
σµi(g−ij) − σµi(g−ij)+1
)1 + ∑
q∈Ni(g′−ij)\i
V¯iq
(
g′ − ij) 1
σµi(g−ij)

 .
That is, since the margical cost of accessing l and j are equal given the network g− ij, we can compare
only the benefits that i obtains from accessing l and j. MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) and MR
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
are expressed below.
MR
(
i; gij →
(
g− ij)) = σ (i; g) σ1 (j; g)
= σ
(
i; g
)
MR
(
i; gil →
(
g− ij)) = σ (i; (g − ij) + il) σ2 (l; (g − ij) + il)
+ σ
(
i;
(
g− ij) + il) σ2 (l; (g− ij) + il) σ1 (k; (g − ij) + il)
= σ
(
i;
(
g − ij) + il) (2 · σ2)
Because σ (i; g) = σ (i; (g− ij) + il), MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) > MR
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
Case 2 Let m be a neighbor of k and m 6= l. As in case 1, MC (i; gil → (g− ij)) = MC
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
,
MR
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
= σ (i; g) σ1 (i; g). Therefore, it remains to quantify MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) and
verify that MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) > MR
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
.
We now quantify a lower bound of MR (i; gil → (g− ij)). Consider the decision of i to access l
when he faces g− ij. In g− ij, i is not in component g′′ but l is. Therefore, as he accesses l, he uses l to
retrieve information of every agent in g′′. Hence, MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) can be expressed as
MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) =
σ (i; g˜) σ (l; g˜) + σ (i; g˜) ∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l
V¯lq (g˜) (3)
The first term is the value of l’s own information that arrives to i. The second term is the value of
information of every node in g′′, apart from l, that travels to i. Observe that the term ∑q∈g′′;q 6=l V¯lq (g˜) is
∑q∈g′′;q 6=l V
(
P¯lq (g˜)
)
, where P¯lq is an optimal lq-path, which is unique because g˜ is minimally connected.
Consider how information flows in P¯lq (g˜) for q ∈ g′′. Information of any q flows to k, then k passes to l
via the link gkl . Therefore, the term ∑q∈g′′;q 6=l V¯lq (g˜) can be expressed as
24
∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l
V¯lq (g˜) =
σ (l; g˜) + σ (l; g˜) ∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l
V¯kq (g˜) (4)
Therefore, to quantify a lower bound of MR (i; gil → (g− ij)), we turn to find a lower bound of
∑q∈g′′;q 6=l V¯kq (g˜). Observe that V¯kq (g˜) = V¯kq (g) because the addition of link gil changes only the
relation between i and l, and l is not in any optimal kq-path. To identify V¯kq (g), consider the payoff of k
in g that is expressed below,
(5a)
Uk
(
g
)
= Rev
(
k; g
) − µ¯k (g) · c
= ∑
q∈g
V¯kq
(
g
) − µ¯k (g) · c
Because k has a link only with those in g′′, substitute g with g′′,
(5b)
Uk
(
g
)
= ∑
q∈g′′
V¯kq
(
g′′
) − µ¯k (g′′) · c
= ∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l
V¯kq
(
g
)
+ σ
(
l; g′′
)
σ
(
k; g′′
) − µ¯k (g′′) · c
= ∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l,k
V¯kq
(
g
)
+ σ
(
l; g′′
)
σ
(
k; g′′
)
+ σ
(
k; g′′
) − µ¯k (g′′) · c
Because we assume that µk (g
′′) = 2, k establishes exactly two links with l and m. Therefore, for any
agent q 6= k, l, k receives q’s information via gkm. The total value of information that flows via gkm is
∑q∈g′′;q 6=l V¯kq (g), which appears in the last line above. Moreover, this strategy gk is k’s best response to
gk. That he maintains exactly two links, together with that this strategy is his best response, are used to
to identify the following lower bound of ∑q∈g′′;q 6=l V¯kq (g).
(6a)Uk
(
g
)
> Uk
(
g − km)
(6b)Uk
((
g − km) + km) > Uk (g − km)
(6c)MR
(
k; gkm →
(
g − km)) > MC (k; gkm
→ (g − km))
(6d)∑
q ∈g′′;q 6=l,k
V¯kq
(
g
)
> c + (σ1 − σ2)
(
σ1
(
k; g − km) + σ1 (k; g − km) σ1 (l; g− km))
(6e)∑
q ∈g′′;q 6=l,k
V¯kq
(
g
)
> c + (1− σ2) (2)
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Thus, we have found the lower bound of ∑q∈g′′;q 6=l,k V¯kq (g) in the last line of the above expression.
To finish the proof, we use it to show that MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) > MC
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) > MR
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
(7)
if and only if (8)
σ (i; g˜) σ (l; g˜) + σ (i; g˜) ∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l
V¯lq (g˜) > σ (i; g) σ (j; g) (9)
Because σ (i; g˜) = σ (i; g) , and σ (j; g) = 1
σ (l; g˜) + ∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l
V¯lq (g˜) > 1 (10)
We now show that the last expression above is valid.
σ (l; g˜) + ∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l
V¯lq (g˜) > 1 (11)
σ (l; g˜) + σ (l; g˜) σ (k; g˜) + σ (l; g˜) ∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l,k
V¯kq (g˜) > 1 (12)
σ2 + σ2σ2 + σ2σ2 ∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l,k
V¯kq (g˜) > 1 (13)
The last inequality is satisfied because σ2 >
1
2 and that ∑q∈g′′;q 6=l,k V¯kq (g) = ∑q∈g′′;q 6=l,k V¯kq (g˜) >
c + (1− σ2) (2). Therefore, MR (i; gil → (g− ij)) > MR
(
j; gij → (g− ij)
)
case 3 The proof follows the same analogy as that of Case 2. The only difference is that the term
∑q∈g′′;q 6=l,k V¯kq (g) in inequality 6e is changed because µ¯k (g) = µk (g) > 2. Despite this change, in
what follows we show that inequality 6e, ∑q∈g′′;q 6=l,k V¯kq (g) > c + (1− σ2), remains valid so that the
rest of the inequalities in the proof of Case 2 are still satisfied. In what follows, parent k is assumed to
have at most one neighbor m that is not an end node.
We provide the proof that guarantees the existence of such parent in any minimally connected net-
work g before proceeding. Suppose, by contradiction, that each parent has at least two neighbors that
are not an end node. Remove all end nodes in the network and all links with them. We have a modified
network gˆ. Observe that gˆ is minimally connected because g is minimally connected. Observe also that
gˆ has no end node because each node in it has at least two links. However, if there is no end node, gˆ is not
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minimally connected 9. A contradiction.
Because m is the only neighbor that is not an end node of k, k observes any non-neighbor q in g′′ via
the link gkm. Formally, let Nkm be the set of all such agents and N
c
km = {q ∈ g′|q /∈ Nkm ∧ q 6= k, l}. We
can express ∑q∈g′′;q 6=l,k V¯kq (g) as
∑
q∈g′′;q 6=l,k
V¯kq (g) = ∑
q∈Nkm
V¯kq (g) + ∑
q∈Nckm
V¯kq (g) (14)
We now show that ∑q∈Nkm V¯kq (g) > c + (1− σ2) (2) to finish the proof. Because ∑q∈Nkm V¯kq (g)
is exactly MR (k; gkm → (g− km)) and that k’s strategy to maintain the links with all his neighbors is
his best response in g, it follows that
MR (k; gkm → (g− km)) > MC (k; gkm → (g− km)) (15)
∑
q∈Nkm
V¯kq (g) > c +
(
σµk(g) − σµk(g)+1
)
(1 + (µk (g)− 2)) (16)
Moreover,
c +
(
σµk(g) − σµk(g)+1
)
(1 + (µk (g)− 2)) > c + (1− σ2) (2) (17)
The last inequality is satisfied because µk (g) ≥ 3 and
(
σµk(g) − σµk(g)+1
)
> (σ1− σ2) due to the
concavity of σ, we conclude that ∑q∈Nkm V¯kq (g) > c + (1− σ2) (2).
Proof (Proof of Proposition 4). The first part is a corollary of the second proposition. For the second
part, let i be the center who estaliblishes all the links and j be a neighbor of i and g∗ be a center-sponsored
star. Our proof consists of two parts. The first one shows that the inequality on the left is a neccessary
and sufficient condition for i to maintain all his links in g. The second one shows that the inequality on
the right is a neccessary and sufficient condition for j to sponsors no link in g. Both parts rely on the
strict concavity of σ.
9any minimal non-empty network has at least one end node. The proof is as follows. Suppose not. Let every
node has at least two links but the network remains minimal. Choose any p and q that are connected. Because q is
has at least two links, q is connected to q′ who is not p, otherwise the network is not minimal. Moreover, q′ also is
connected to q′′ who is neither q′ nor p nor q for the same reason. This induction repetes infinitely because every
node has at least two links. It follows that this network has infinite nodes. A contradiction.
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Part 1: The neccessary and sufficient condition for i to maintain all his links in g∗ is σn−1 −
(n− 1) (σn−2− σn−1) ≥ c. We first show the neccessary condition. If i’s best response is to maintain
all his links, then he does not want to deviate from g∗ by deleting one link, i.e., Ui (g∗)−Ui (g∗ − ij) ≥ 0
or MR
(
i; gij → (g∗ − ij)
)−MC (i; gij → (g∗ − ij)) ≥ 0 by Lemma 1. Because MR (i; gij → (g∗ − ij)) =
σn (i) σ1 (j) and MC
(
i; gij → (g∗ − ij)
)
= c+ (σn−2− σn−1) (n− 1), σn−1− (n− 1) (σn−2− σn−1) >
c is the neccessary condition.
To show the sufficient condition, our goal is to show that if the sufficient condition σn−1 =
MR
(
i; gij → (g∗ − ij)
) ≥ c + (n− 1) (σn−2− σn−1) = MC (i; gij → g∗) holds, i’s best response
to g∗−i is to sponsor n − 1 links to all agents. Let gk = g∗−i ∪
{
gi,j1 , gi,j2 , ..., gi,jk
}
be a situation in
which i responses g∗−i by sponsoring k links. To finish the proof, we now show that Ui
(
g∗ = gn−1
) ≥
Ui
(
gn−2
) ≥ . . . ≥ Ui (g∗−i), given the sufficient condition.
By lemma 1, this is equivalent to prove that MR
(
i; gik → gk−1
) ≥ MC (i; gik → gk−1) for all k.
Observe that MR
(
i; gik → gk−1
)
= σk (i) σ1 and MC
(
i; gik → gk−1
)
= c + (σk − σk−1) (1 + (k− 1)).
Moreover, MR
(
i; gik → gk−1
)
is strictly decreasing in k while MC
(
i; gik → gk−1
)
is strictly increas-
ing in k because σk < σk−1 and (σk − σk−1) > (σk−1 − σk−2) due to the strict concavity of σ.
Therefore, if MR
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
) ≥ MC (i; gij → (g− ij)), then MR (i; gik → (gk−1)) = σk ≥
MR
(
i; gin−1 →
(
gn−2
)) ≥ MC (i; gin−1 → (gn−2)) ≥ MC (i; gik → (gk−1)) ; ∀k ≤ n− 2. Hence,
Ui
(
g∗ = gn−1
) ≥ Ui (gn−2) ≥ . . . > Ui (g∗−i).
Part 2: The neccessary and sufficient condition for j to maintain all his links in g∗ is c ≥
(σ2)
2−σn−1− (1− σ2) (1 + (n− 2) σn−1). Both the neccessary and sufficient condition will be proved
using the analogy of Part 1. The only difference is that this inequality motivates j to maintain no link,
while c ≤ σn−1− (n− 1) (σn−2− σn−1) motivates i to maintain all the links.
For the neccessary condition, let j′ 6= j be a neighbor of i. We will show that the inequality that causes
j to add no link to j′ is exactly c ≥ (σ2)2 − σn−1− (1− σ2) (1 + (n− 2) σn−1), making this inequality
a neccessary condition. By Lemma 1, Ui (g
∗ + jj′)−Ui (g∗) ≤ 0 if and only if MR
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
≤
MC
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
. Observe that MR
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
= σ2 (j; g
∗ + jj′) σ2 (j′; g∗ + jj′)− σn−1 (i; g∗)
σ1 (i; g
∗ + jj′) because j benefits from obtaining the information of j′ via the new link instead of obtaining
it indirectly via i. Moreover, MC
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
= c + (σ1 (i; g
∗)− σ2 (i; g∗ + jj′)) (1 + σn−1 (n− 2)),
where the term σn−1 (n− 2) is what j receives via i except the information of j′. Therefore, MR
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
−MC
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
= (n− 1) (σn−2− σn−1) + c− σn−1 ≤ 0 is the neccessary condition.
Next, let us consider the sufficient condition. In g∗, j has to access all the nodes via i. Thus, his devi-
ation is to add some links with other neighbors in order that he can reach them directly. We will find that
such deviation is never profitable if the sufficient condition holds. Let gm = g∗ ∪ gj,j1 , gj,j2 , ..., gj,jm ; n−
2 ≥ m ≥ 1 be a situation in which j adds m links to the nodes that are not i. Now consider the following
four terms
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• MR
(
j; gjm → gm
)
= σ2σm+1 − σn−1σm
• MR
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
= σ2 − σn−1
• MC
(
j; gjm → gm
)
= (σm − σm+1) (1 + σn−1 + σn−1 (n− 3−m) + σ2 ·m)
• MC
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
= (σ1 − σ2) (1 + σn−1 + σn−1 (n− 3))
Because σm < σm−1 and (σ1 − σ2) < (σm − σm+1), MR
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
> MR
(
j; gjm → gm
)
and MC
(
j; gjm → gm
)
> MC
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
for all m. Therefore, the sufficient condition, which is
MR
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
≤ MC
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
, implies that MR
(
j; gjm → gm
)
< MR
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
<
MC
(
j; gjj′ → g∗
)
< MC
(
j; gjm → gm
)
for all m. By lemma 1, these inequalities imply that Uj (g
∗) ≥
Uj
(
g∗ + jj′ = g1
)
> Uj
(
g2
)
> · · · > Uj
(
gn−2
)
. Therefore, j’s best response to g∗i is to maintain no
link.
A.3 Proof of Example 2
Proof (Proof of Example 2). Any network that has a node with three or more neighbors is not nash
because σ3 = 0. Therefore, onwards we consider only networks whose every node has at most two
neighbors.
The first kind of networks we eliminate as candidates for nash networks is any network that contains
a component that is a cycle of less than 5 players. Let gij be a link in such cycle. If i deletes gij, the cycle
component becomes a line. Because MR
(
i; gij → (g− ij)
)
< 0 for any a cycle of less than 5 players, i’s
payoff in the line is higher than his payoff in the cycle. Therefore, he has an incentive to destroy gij.
Next, among the networks that remain to be considered, we partition them into eight sets of networks
according to the following criterion. For g 6= g′, g¯ = g¯′ if and only if they belong to the same group.
Figure 13 depicts all of them. Except group (a), positive deviation in each group can be easily identified.
Table 1 summarizes the deviations.
Finally, for the first set, we list all networks in this set in Figure 14 and point out a positive deviation
in each of them in 2
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edcba
(a)
edcba
(b)
edcba
(c)
edcba
(d)
edcba
(e)
edcba
(f)
edcba
(g)
edcba
(h)
Figure 13: We divide networks into 8 groups according to the following criterion. g¯ = g¯′ if and
only if they belong to the same group.
Network Deviating Agent Deviation
(b) e access d
(c) a (b) destroy gab (gba) and make gac (gbc)
(d) e access d
(e) e access d
(f) e access d
(g) e (a) destroy gea (gae)
(h) e access d
Table 1: Positive deviations found in each group of networks in 13
Network Deviating Agent Deviation
(a) d destroy gde
(b) c destroy gcd
(c) c destroy gde
(d) d destroy gde
(e) d destroy gde
(f) d destroy gde
(g) d destroy gde
(h) b destroy gbc
(i) b destroy gbc
(j) d destroy gde
(k) b destroy gbc
(l) c destroy gcb
(m) b destroy gba
(n) d destroy gdc
(o) b destroy gba
(p) a destroy gba
Table 2: Positive deviation found in each network in group (a)
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edcba
(a)
edcba
(b)
edcba
(c)
edcba
(d)
edcba
(e)
edcba
(f)
edcba
(g)
edcba
(h)
edcba
(i)
edcba
(j)
edcba
(k)
a b c d e
(l)
a b c d e
(m)
a b c d e
(n)
a b c d e
(o)
a b c d e
(p)
Figure 14: All possible 16 networks in group (a)
31
